Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act by Pouliot, Eve L.
SMU Law Review
Volume 49
Issue 4 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 11
1996
Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act
Eve L. Pouliot
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eve L. Pouliot, Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 49 SMU L. Rev. 871 (1996)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol49/iss4/11




I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 872
II. DTPA CASE LAW ....................................... 873
A. PROPER PLAINTIFFS: WHO IS A CONSUMER? . . . . . . . . . . . 873
1. Step 1: Did the Plaintiff Seek or Acquire Goods or
Services by Purchase or Lease? .................... 873
a. An Intended Beneficiary Qualifies as a DTPA
Consum er ..................................... 874
b. An Incidental Beneficiary Does Not Qualify as
a DTPA Consumer ............................ 875
c. An Employee Does Not Usually Qualify as a
Consum er ..................................... 876
d. A Subrogor Does Not Step into its Insured's
Consumer Status .............................. 877
e. A Purchaser of Option Contracts is Not a
DTPA Consumer .............................. 878
f. Under an Antitrust Analysis, the "Indirect
Purchaser" is Not a Consumer ................ 879
2. Step 2: Do the Goods or Services Purchased or
Leased Form the Basis of the D TPA Complaint? .. 881
a. Slip and Fall Cases Fail this Test .............. 881
B. WHAT QUALIFIES AS ACTIONABLE CONDUCT UNDER
THE D TPA ? ........................................... 881
1. Breach of Warranty ................................ 881
2. Unconscionable Actions ........................... 883
3. False, Misleading or Deceptive Acts-The Laundry
L ist ............................................... 885
a. When is a Failure to Disclose Information
A ctionable? ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  885
b. When does a Failure to Perform a Future
Promise Become an Actionable Affirmative
Misrepresentation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  887
C. WHAT CONSTITUTES A PRODUCING CAUSE? . . . . . . . . . . 887
1. When Does a Casual Connection Exist? ........... 888
* B.S., Cornell University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate, Lynn,
Stodghill, Melsheirner & Tillotson, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas. All rights reserved (1995). Spe-
cial thanks to Michael P. Lynn for his thoughts and contributions to this article.
SMU LAW REVIEW
2. Attorney Malpractice as a Producing Cause ........ 888
a. Criminal Cases ................................ 888
b. Civil Cases .................................... 888
3. The Effect of an "As Is" Clause on Establishing a
Producing Cause .................................. 890
D. DTPA DAMAGES ..................................... 891
1. Offsetting D TPA Claims ........................... 891
2. Trebling Prejudgment Interest ...................... 892
III. THE 1995 AMENDMENTS TO THE DTPA ............. 893
A. SECTION 17.42. WAIVERS: PUBLIC POLICY ............. 893
B. SECTION 17.44. CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION .... 894
C. SECTION 17.45. DEFINITIONS .......................... 894
D. SECTION 17.46. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
U NLAW FUL ............................................ 895
E. SECTION 17.49. EXEMPTIONS .......................... 895
F. SECTION 17.50. RELIEF FOR CONSUMERS .............. 896
G. SECTION 17.505. NOTICE; INSPECTION ................. 897
H. SECTION 17.5051. MEDIATION ......................... 897
I. SECTION 17.5052. OFFERS OF SETTLEMENT ............ 898
J. SECTION 17.56. VENUE ................................ 898
K. EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 1995 AMENDMENTS ......... 898
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................... 898
I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Act1 (DTPA) is unique both in the amount of litigation it gener-
ates2 and in the frequency of its legislative amendment. 3 The Sur-
vey period proved to be no exception. During the Survey period, Texas
courts reported over one hundred and fifty decisions involving cases
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996 [herein-
after DTPAJ.
2. At one point, the Texas DTPA accounted for approximately one half of all decep-
tive trade practices' decisions nationwide. Anthony P. Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Pro-
tection: The Practical Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL.
L. REV. 427, 449 (1984). Another study, which focused on the Houston docket, indicated
that about 15% of the cases filed contained DTPA claims. Nancy Friedman Atlas et al.,
The DTPA In the Courts: How It Is Used In Practice, 28 Hou. LAW. 28, 29 (Aug. 1990).
3. In every legislative session since its enactment, the legislature has amended the
DTPA. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 24, 1975, ch. 62, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 149; Act of May 23,
1977, ch. 216, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600; Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 603, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws
1327; Act of June 8, 1981, ch. 307, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 863; Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 883,
1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4943; Act of June 12, 1985, ch. 564, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2165; Act of
June 11, 1987, ch. 280, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 1641; Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 380, 1989 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1490; Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1082, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 4370; Act of June 6,
1991, ch. 242, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 939; Act of June 11, 1993, ch. 570, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
2099; Act of June 8,1995, ch. 414, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2988. See Richard M. Alderman &
Melanie P. Rosenthal, A Consumer Update: Recent Developments Under the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 495,497 n.4 (1989); James W. Paulsen, Lenders
and The Texas DTPA: A Step Back From The Brink, 48 SMU L. REv. 487 (1995).
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where the parties asserted DTPA violations. In the next section, this arti-
cle reviews several of those decisions. Finally, since the legislature over-
hauled the DTPA during its 1995 session, section III of this article
discusses the 1995 amendments and their probable implications.
II. DTPA CASE LAW
To recover under the DTPA, a plaintiff must establish that he is a "con-
sumer," that the defendant engaged in a false, misleading, or deceptive
act or an unconscionable act or breached an express or implied warranty,
and that the action was a producing cause of his damage.4 Significant
decisions reported during this period addressed each of these elements as
well as issues concerning calculation of damages. The following section
discusses those decisions.
A. PROPER PLAINTIFFS: WHO IS A CONSUMER?
To recover under the DTPA, a plaintiff must establish that he is a "con-
sumer."'5 Whether a plaintiff is a consumer is a question of law for the
courts to determine. 6 Plaintiff bears the burden of proof regarding his
consumer status.7 In Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes,8 the Texas
Supreme Court recognized that in order to qualify as a consumer, two
requirements must be met: (1) the plaintiff "must have sought or acquired
goods or services by purchase or lease;" and (2) "the goods or services
leased must form the basis of the complaint." 9 Texas courts use this two-
step analysis to determine a plaintiff's consumer status.
1. Step 1: Did the plaintiff seek or acquire goods or services by
purchase or lease?
When the plaintiff has not purchased or leased the goods or services at
issue, he lacks contractual privity to the consumer transaction. Texas
courts, however, do not analyze a plaintiffs consumer standing according
4. Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995). See
also Custom Controls Co. v. MDS Qantel, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987), rev'd on other grounds, Qantel Business Sys., Inc. v. Custom Controls Co.,
761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1988); Miller v. Soliz, 648 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1983, no writ); Bormaster v. Henderson, 624 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); DTPA § 17.50(a)(1)-(3).
5. DTPA § 17.50. "Consumer" means an individual, partnership, corporation, this
state, or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease,
any goods or services, except that the term does not include a business consumer that has
assets of $25 million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with
assets of $25 million or more. DTPA § 17.45(4).
6. 3z Corp. v. Stewart Title Guar.Co., 851 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1993, writ denied).
7. Taylor v. GWR Operating Co., 820 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
8. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
9. Id. at 351-52 (citing Sherman Simon Enter.,,Inc. v. Lorac Serv. Corp., 724 S.W.2d
13, 15 (Tex. 1987); Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981)).
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to his contractual relationship with the defendant. 10 Instead, courts re-
view the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction. 1 While the test has
never actually been referred to as such, the cases indicate that the courts
apply an intended beneficiary analysis in those situations where the plain-
tiff did not himself purchase or lease the goods or services.' 2
a. An Intended Beneficiary Qualifies as a DTPA Consumer
In Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Fulda,13 the Beaumont Court of Appeals
applied the intended beneficiary analysis to determine whether Fulda
qualified as a DTPA consumer. Fulda's father sought to buy life insur-
ance from Hartford Life Insurance Company ("Hartford"). He applied
for their maximum policy, naming Fulda as the beneficiary.
The application contained several authorization forms which allowed
the insurance company to obtain information about the applicant.
Fulda's father completed these forms. While waiting for Hartford to ac-
cept his application, the father applied for a second, but different, group
life insurance policy. Hartford, however, also offered the second policy.
According to its terms, the second policy capped recovery at $100,000 per
applicant.
When Fulda's father died, Fulda, as named beneficiary, attempted to
claim the benefits under the first policy. Claiming that the second policy's
capped recovery clause eliminated the benefits offered under the initial
policy, Hartford denied the enforceability of the first policy. Fulda sued
Hartford on a host of theories, including the DTPA.14 The jury found in
favor of Fulda, so Hartford appealed.
On the issue of consumer status, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held
that Fulda qualified as a DTPA consumer.' 5 After reviewing the evi-
dence, the court made two findings concerning the first insurance policy:
(1) Fulda's father had fully performed his obligations under the insurance
contract, including filling out all necessary application forms and paying
all the premiums; and (2) Fulda was the named beneficiary to that insur-
ance contract. 16 As the named beneficiary of the insurance policy, Fulda
was obviously an intended beneficiary. Accordingly, the court held that
10. Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 368 (Tex. 1987).
11. Id.
12. See Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Tex. 1983).
13. No. 09-94-168 CV, 1995 WL 261996 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, May 4, 1995, n.w.h.)
(not designated for publication).
14. Id. at *1.
15. Id. at *21.
16. Id. at *22 (emphasis added). Cf Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269,
274 (Tex. 1995) (holding a third party who attempts to negotiate a settlement with insurer,
is not a consumer because he does not seek to purchase or lease goods or services, he
merely wishes to obtain the proceeds of the policy). In Fulda, the claimant was a named




he must qualify as a consumer.17
In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp.,'s the Houston Court
of Appeals analyzed the consumer standing of Perry Equipment Corpo-
ration ("PECO"). PECO purchased another company-Maloney Pipe-
line Systems, Inc. ("Maloney"). As part of the deal, Maloney agreed to
pay for an audit of itself performed by Arthur Andersen for PECO's ben-
efit. During the audit, Arthur Andersen found Maloney to be operating
at a loss. Arthur Andersen, however, prepared financial statements for
PECO showing Maloney to be a profitable company. Shortly after the
purchase occurred, Maloney started to require cash infusions from
PECO. One year later, Maloney filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding. 19
Consequently, PECO sued Arthur Andersen contending that the finan-
cial statements prepared by Arthur Andersen overstated the profits and
net worth of Maloney by millions of dollars.20 PECO alleged fraud, neg-
ligence, breach of implied warranty, and violations of the DTPA.21 At
trial, the jury awarded PECO almost ten million dollars in damages, and
Arthur Andersen appealed.22
On appeal, Arthur Andersen alleged that PECO was not a "consumer"
of Arthur Andersen's audit services under the DTPA.23 Because the au-
dit was a condition of the sale and because Arthur Andersen prepared a
separate audit of Maloney for the purpose of supplying PECO with its
financial statements, the court held that PECO "sought and acquired the
auditing services of Arthur Andersen. '24 So what's the issue?
"[A]lthough PECO 'sought and acquired' Arthur Andersen's auditing
services, it did not, itself 'pay' Arthur Anderson directly for those serv-
ices."'25 Regardless, the court ruled that Maloney paid for Arthur Ander-
son's services for the benefit of PECO and upheld its DTPA consumer
standing.2 6 Once again, a court upheld consumer standing for an in-
tended beneficiary.
b. An Incidental Beneficiary Does Not Qualify as a DTPA
Consumer
In Thompson v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P.,27 the Houston Court of Ap-
peals determined the consumer standing of two beneficiaries of a will
17. Id. The court stated that to hold otherwise would effectively prohibit the named
beneficiaries of insurance policies from bringing suit to collect or recover the policy's bene-
fits under the DTPA. Id.
18. 898 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
19. 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 701-766 (Law Co-op. 1987 and Supp. 1994).
20. Arthur Andersen, 898 S.W.2d at 917.
21. Id. at 914.
22. Id. at 917-18.
23. Id. at 918.
24. Id.
25. Arthur Andersen, 898 S.W.2d at 918.
26. Id. at 918-19.
27. 902 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, n.w.h.).
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who sought to sue upon the services rendered to the defendant in making
the will. The Thompsons were the widow and daughter of James R.
Thompson. After his death, they learned that he had secretly changed his
will two months before his death. As a result, they sued the accountants
and their firm for helping him do so and for not informing them of his
intention to do so.
The Thompsons asserted a host of theories: breach of fiduciary duty by
reason of self-dealing and actual or constructive fraud; civil conspiracy;
negligent misrepresentation; breach of fiduciary duty by reason of con-
flict of interest and tortious interference with inheritance rights and ac-
tual or constructive fraud; negligence; gross negligence; and DTPA. The
trial court granted a directed verdict against four of their claims and sub-
mitted the remainder to the jury.28 The jury found against the Thomp-
sons, and the trial court entered a take-nothing verdict.2 9
On appeal, the Thompsons contended that the trial court erred in di-
recting a verdict on their DTPA claims.30 The trial court granted the di-
rected verdict because the Thompsons did not qualify as consumers under
the DTPA.3 1 The Thompsons complained about the defendants services
in helping to construct a new will for James R. Thompson. Reasoning
that James R. Thompson purchased those services for his own benefit and
not theirs, the court held that the Thompsons were not intended benefi-
ciaries. 32 Because the Thompsons were not intended beneficiaries, the
court denied their DTPA consumer status and affirmed the trial courts
ruling. 33
c. An Employee Does Not Usually Qualify as a Consumer
During the last Survey period, the Austin Court of Appeals also re-
fused to expand the intended beneficiary consumer analysis to include
incidental beneficiaries. 34 Applying the intended beneficiary analysis in
the employment context, the Austin Court of Appeals stated that an em-
ployee-plaintiff is only entitled to DTPA consumer status for claims in-
volving goods or services that the employer purchased or leased primarily
for the employee's benefit. 35 During this Survey period, two other appel-
late courts reviewed the issue of whether an employee was a consumer
under the DTPA.
28. Id. at 16.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id.
32. Thompson, 902 S.W.2d at 19.
33. Id. Clearly, the Thompsons were incidental beneficiaries of the defendants' serv-
ices because the will named them. However, even if the Thompsons were intended benefi-
ciaries, the defendants' services were not actionable under the DTPA because the
producing cause of their damage was James Thompson's decision to change his will, not the
defendants' assistance in effectuating that decision.
34. See Eve L. Pouliot and William Christopher Carmody, Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 1113, 1115-16 (1995) (discussing Brandon v. American Sterilizer Co.,
880 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, n.w.h.)) [hereinafter Survey 1994].
35. Id. at 1115.
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In Figueroa v. West,36 the El Paso Court of Appeals determined
whether an employee was a consumer as required by the DTPA.
Anabelle Figueroa (Figueroa) sued her former employer Kirby West for
wrongful termination based on breach of oral and written contracts,
fraud, negligence, and the DTPA.37 The trial court directed a verdict in
favor of the employer, and Figueroa appealed.
After reviewing the case, the court found no evidence that Figueroa
was a consumer.38 As an employee, Figueroa received work from Kirby
West, not goods or services. Accordingly, the court held that she failed to
establish her consumer status. 39
In Nabors Loffland Drilling Co. v. Martinez,40 the San Antonio Court
of Appeals faced the same question. Rosendo Martinez (Martinez)
worked for a company that had contracted to do work for Nabors Loff-
land Drilling Co. (Nabors). While moving a building for Nabors, an acci-
dent occurred injuring Martinez. Martinez sued Nabors, and the jury
awarded him $270,000 in damages. 41 Nabors appealed, alleging that Mar-
tinez was not a consumer under the DTPA.4 2
Citing Kennedy v. Sale,43 the court acknowledged that an individual
who has not bought anything can still be a consumer.44 After reviewing
the evidence, however, the court determined that "[n]o contract was en-
tered into for Martinez's benefit or with Martinez. ''45 As a result, Marti-
nez did not qualify as a consumer under the DTPA.46
d. A Subrogor Does Not Step into its Insured's Consumer Status
In Trimble v. Itz, 4 7 the San Antonio Court of Appeals reviewed the
question of whether an insurance company may assume the consumer
status of its subrogee for purposes of bringing a claim under the DTPA.48
The Trimble's home was destroyed by fire. State Farm Lloyds, Inc. (State
Farm) reimbursed the Trimbles $537,760.83 towards their losses. Pursu-
ing their rights of subrogation, State Farm sued the defendants who had
constructed and wired the Trimble's home.49 The trial court entered sum-
36. 902 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, n.w.h.).
37. Id. at 703.
38. Id. at 707.
39. id. (citing Currey v. Lone Star Steel Co., 676 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, no writ). The court, however, noted that "[a]lthough the DTPA is clearly
consumer protection legislation, and not a labor law, we need not hold that an employee
may never be a consumer." Id.
40. 894 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
41. Id. at 74.
42. Id.
43. 689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985) (holding a third-party beneficiary of an insurance pol-
icy is a consumer under the DTPA).
44. Nabors, 894 S.W.2d at 74 (citing Kennedy, 689 S.W.2d at 892).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 898 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995), writ denied per curiam, 906
S.W.2d 481 (Tex. 1995).




mary judgment holding that State Farm was not a consumer for DTPA
purposes. 50
On appeal, State Farm argued that it could claim its insureds' consumer
status and sue under the DTPA. After reviewing the statutory definition
of consumer, the court held that State Farm was not a consumer because
it had assets in excess of $25 million.51 The court simply refused to ex-
pand the DTPA beyond the specific language of the statute and allow
State Farm to assume the consumer status of its subrogees. 52
e. A Purchaser of Option Contracts is Not a DTPA Consumer
In Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.,53 an investor brought suit
against her broker for failing to purchase oil contracts as she had re-
quested, alleging negligence and violations of the DTPA. The Houston
Court of Appeals analyzed whether the investor qualified as a consumer
under the DTPA. The court started by assessing whether the sale of com-
modities option contracts qualified as a sale of goods under the DTPA.
A commodity option contract is a right, for a limited period of time, to
buy or sell the commodity in question at a predetermined price. Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that a commodity option contract is an intangible. 54
As an intangible, an option contract does not fit within the definition of a
"good" supplied by the DTPA.55
The court's next consumer analysis focused on whether the investor
had purchased "services. '56 Services can be sought or purchased outright
and also can be obtained in connection with the acquisition of goods. 57
Because the investor used the broker services merely to effectuate trades
and did not use his services for advice or any other service, the court held
50. Id.
51. Id. at 372.
52. Trimble, 898 S.W.2d at 372. This decision comports with the current political envi-
ronment for the DTPA. As the 1995 legislative amendments indicate, a significant contin-
gent exists which is determined to limit the expansive scope of the DTPA. See infra
Section III (discussing the 1995 amendments and their probable implications). See gener-
ally Michael P. Lynn and Eve L. Pouliot, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Pro-
tection Act: Then and Now, State Bar of Texas Advanced Civil Trial Course, 1995
[hereinafter Then and Now].
53. 889 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
54. Id. at 497-98. "[Nlumerous courts have held that intangibles are not "goods" and
thus, are excluded from coverage under the DTPA." Id. at 497 (citing to Swenson v. En-
gelstad, 626 F.2d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1980) (stock certificates, choses in action, and other
incorporeal rights); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1980)
(money); Cowen v. First Nat'l Bank, 63 S.W. 532, 533 (1901) (bills and notes); Portland
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Gov't Sec., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 241, 245
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 620 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1981) (cer-
tificates of deposit); Snyders Smart Shop v. Santi, Inc., 590 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ) (accounts receivable)).
55. Id. at 497-98.
56. "Services" are defined as "work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use,
including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." DTPA
§ 17.45(2).




that she had not purchased "services" as contemplated by the DTPA.58
Thus, she did not qualify as a consumer for DTPA purposes.
f. Under an Antitrust Analysis, the "Indirect Purchaser" is Not a
Consumer
Applying the "indirect purchaser" doctrine from antitrust law, 59 one
set of crafty Defendants successfully nullified the Plaintiffs' consumer
standing under the DTPA. In Segura v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,60 the
plaintiffs intervened in an antitrust suit originally brought by the State of
Texas. In the original action on behalf of the consumers, the State of
Texas sought injunctive relief and damages for alleged overcharging for
infant formula. Concluding that the indirect purchaser doctrine deprived
the State of standing to sue, the trial court dismissed the State's claims.61
Alleging DTPA violations based on the same conduct on which the
State had premised its claims, plaintiffs intervened. 62 In response, De-
fendants argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because to hold
otherwise would allow the DTPA to conflict with the Texas Antitrust Act
because one law would give standing to indirect purchasers and the other
would not. Because the Texas Antitrust Act was the later-enacted stat-
ute, Defendants argued that it should pre-empt the DTPA, allowing the
indirect purchaser doctrine to come into play thereby depriving the plain-
tiffs of standing to sue.63
Focusing on two points which indicated to it that the legislature did not
intend to have the Texas Antitrust Act supersede or pre-empt the DTPA,
the court of appeals found Defendants' argument unpersuasive. First, the
court noted that both statutes included cumulative remedies provisions,
which allow a plaintiff to recover under the statute as well as other laws,
as long as to do so, does not give the plaintiff a double recovery.64 Sec-
ond, the court focused on the simple fact that whenever the legislature
wanted to exempt a certain type of defendant or claim from the purview
of the DTPA, it did so in unequivocal terms.65 "If the legislature had
intended to exclude indirect purchasers from coverage of the DTPA, it
58. Id. Where a non-licensed individual cannot purchase commodities option con-
tracts and where a person requesting such a service is usually charged a percentage-based
service fee, it seems to be a debatable point as to whether or not the investor actually
purchased a service when she asked the broker to purchase those contracts for her.
59. In the antitrust context, a "direct purchaser" is one who purchases goods or serv-
ices directly from a manufacturer, a wholesaler, or other entity who has violated section 4
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988). An "indirect purchaser" is one who
purchases such goods or services from a seller who is down line in the marketing chain
from the antitrust violator. The "Indirect Purchaser" doctrine deprives an indirect pur-
chaser of standing to sue an antitrust violator because to allow otherwise would create
difficult issues as to how much of the monopoly price was "passed on" to the end consumer
by the middlemen. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 741-47 (1977).
60. 873 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994), rev'd, 907 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1995).
61. Id. at 401.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 404.
65. Sequra, 873 S.W.2d at 404-05.
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could easily have done so by simply drafting the restriction into the defi-
nition of consumer or some other provision of the Act."66 In the absence
of such an express exemption in either the DTPA or the Texas Antitrust
Act, the court declined to hold that the indirect purchaser doctrine ap-
plied to the DTPA.67 As indirect purchasers of the infant formula, the
plaintiffs qualified as consumers and could maintain a DTPA cause of
action.
A divided Texas Supreme Court, however, disagreed and reversed the
court of appeals' decision. 68 Justices Phillips wrote the majority opinion
in which Justices Hightower, Hecht, Enoch and Owen joined. Their opin-
ion stated that indirect purchasers could not use the DTPA as an end run
around the antitrust laws. 69 In a concurring opinion, Justice Gonzales
agreed in essence with the majority that the DTPA should not be used to
create a loophole in the state's Antitrust laws. Justice Cornyn also wrote
a concurring opinion. In his opinion, he stated that it was unnecessary to
reach the question of whether the Anti-trust Act pre-empted a DTPA
cause of action because the DTPA claims were without merit.70 Justices
Gammage and Spector, however, joined in a dissent. Focusing on the
presence of cumulative remedies provisions in both statutes, the dissent
was unable to reconcile their presence with the majority's decision sup-
porting pre-emption of the DTPA by the Texas Antitrust Act.71
While it is unclear how this Antitrust/DTPA interaction issue will ulti-
mately be resolved, the 1995 Amendments to the DTPA raise some inter-
esting questions regarding the court's analysis. 72 Clearly, the court's
decision goes against the grain of the DTPA. The DTPA was originally
66. Id. at 405 (citing Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d at 540) (Tex.
1981)).
67. Id. Also playing a part in the court's decision was the presumption against finding
statutes to be in conflict by implication. Id.
68. Abbott Lab., Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1995).
69. Id. at 505-07.
70. Id. at 507. After analyzing the Texas DTPA case law regarding "unconscionable
acts," he found that defendants had not committed unconscionable acts. Id. at 509. Be-
cause the marketplace abounds with information about infant nutrition, Justice Cornyn
found that plaintiffs operated in a self-imposed ignorance, and therefore, could not claim
that Defendants had taken unfair advantage of their lack of knowledge. Id. Furthermore,
he was not convinced that a sales mark-up of two to five and one half times manufacturing
costs rose to the level of a "gross disparity" of value. Id. at 510.
71. Id. at 511-16.
72. As the court of appeals' decision reasoned, if the legislature had intended to ex-
clude indirect purchasers from the purview of the DTPA, it could easily have done so.
When the legislature amended section 17.49 by the Act of June 8, 1995, the court of ap-
peals' decision had already been reached. If they had disagreed with its reasoning or hold-
ing, then it surely would have included anti-trust cases among the additions to the list of
specific exemptions from the DTPA. See infra Section IV (e) (discussing the numerous
additions to the list of specific areas of law to be exempt from the DTPA § 17.49, and
Antitrust law was not included). The legislature, however, removed the "gross disparity"
prong, relied on by the antitrust consumers in their DTPA cases, from the definition of
"unconscionable acts." See infra Section III (c) (discussing the removal of the "gross dis-
parity" language from the DTPA). Would this deletion effectively prevent an antitrust case
from being brought under the DTPA? See Abbott Lab., 907 S.W.2d 503, 513 (J. Cornyn
concurring) (holding that DTPA claims were without merit).
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enacted to protect private individual consumers from the overreaching of
big business. 73 While the DTPA gives consumers a vehicle for redressing
wrongs, the Abbott Laboratories decision eliminates this remedy for the
individual consumer who has suffered damages caused by big business'
monopolistic practices.
2. Step 2: Do the Goods or Services Purchased or Leased Form the
Basis of the D TPA Complaint?
a. Slip and Fall Cases Fail this Test
After a plaintiff meets the first requirement of the Melody Home test
by showing that he is a direct purchaser/lessee or an intended beneficiary
of the transaction, he must go on to show that those goods and services
sought and acquired by the transaction form the basis of his DTPA com-
plaint.74 During the Survey period, two reported cases dealt with slip and
fall plaintiffs who alleged violations of the DTPA.75 In both cases, the
courts of appeal held the plaintiffs failed to qualify as consumers because
the services about which they complained-maintaining the floors in a
safe condition-was neither the good nor service which they sought to
acquire when they entered the store.76 Because the slip and fall plaintiff
cannot meet the second requirement of the Melody Home test, they do
not qualify as a DTPA consumer. 77
B. WHAT QUALIFIES AS ACTIONABLE CONDUCT UNDER THE DTPA?
1. Breach of Warranty78
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the is-
sue of when an implied warranty will be recognized. In Parkway Co. v.
Woodruff,79 the Woodruffs purchased a home in a master-planned com-
munity known as Sugar Creek. They were the third family to occupy the
home. Two years later, Parkway, the successor developer for the commu-
nity, began to develop the section of land that lies adjacent to their prop-
73. See Then and Now, n.13, supra note 52.
74. Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 351-52.
75. Henry v. Cullum Companies, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995,
writ denied); Ramirez v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 909 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995,
writ denied).
76. Henry, 891 S.W.2d at 795; Ramirez, 909 S.W.2d at 68 (citing Henry). The Hand
court expressed similar reasoning when it stated "all transactions, whether they concern
tangibles or intangibles, involve human service to some extent, the cost of which is in-
cluded in the price of the transaction. Thus, it could be argued that every transaction
involves the purchase of 'services' under the DTPA." Hand, 889 S.W.2d at 499. To recog-
nize such tangential services under the DTPA would extend the reach of the DTPA even
further than it already goes. Given the recent trend toward curtailing its reach, these three
court decisions are in sync with the political environment surrounding the DTPA and its
applications. See generally, Then and Now, supra note 52.
77. Henry, 891 S.W.2d at 795; Ramirez, 909 S.W.2d at 68.
78. The DTPA prohibits the breach of an express or implied warranty. DTPA
§ 17.50(a)(2).
79. 901 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1995).
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erty. During the course of construction, Parkway constructed a concrete
wall along the line dividing the two properties.
Mr. Woodruff, an engineer, immediately notified Parkway by letter
that the wall might alter the drainage patterns on his lot. After an investi-
gation,.Parkway proposed a new drainage system. Because the new sys-
tem required an earthen berm to be built across the back of his property,
Mr. Woodruff objected. Accordingly, he installed a drainage system of
his choice. While Parkway offered to pay for this system, Mr. Woodruff
declined the offer because it would have required him and his wife to
release the company from any further liability.
The Woodruffs' home flooded later that year and again in 1986, 1987,
and 1989. The flooding caused the house's foundation to crack and other
structural damage. After the first incidence, the Woodruffs filed suit al-
leging negligence, gross negligence, nuisance, trespass, water code and
DTPA violations. At trial, the jury found Parkway's actions negligent, in
violation of the water code, in breach of an implied warranty, and uncon-
scionable. 80 Parkway appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the ma-jority of the judgment, reversing only those damages awarded for mental
anguish because of a lack of evidence. 81
Parkway filed a writ of error. The Texas Supreme Court granted its
writ, and reviewed the case. After passing on the question of whether the
Woodruffs qualified as consumers, the court determined that Parkway
had not violated the DTPA and reformed the damage award to reflect its
decision.82
Analyzing the Woodruffs' DTPA claims, the court held that the Wood-
ruffs did not have an implied warranty from Parkway promising to per-
form future development services in a good and workmanlike manner. 83
A warranty must be recognized by either statutory or common law. 84
The implied service warranty is a creature born of common law. 85 Thus,
the Texas Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether an im-
plied warranty to perform future development services existed.
Reviewing the case law, the court noted that implied warranties in ser-
vice transactions were of relatively recent creation. 86 According to the
court, an implied warranty will not be judicially recognized unless there is
80. Id. at 437-38.
81. Id.; 857 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).
82. Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 441.
83. Id. at 440.
84. Id. at 438.
85. Id. See also Melody Homes Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1987)("An implied warranty arises by operation of law when public policy so mandates.")
86. According to the court, statutes like the DTPA provide an incentive to plaintiffs to
characterize simple negligence actions differently in an attempt to obtain enhanced reme-
dies. Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 438 n.4. Furthermore, "[tiraditionally, commentators re-jected the idea that warranties applied to services at all." Id. For these two reasons, the
court was skeptical to recognize an implied warranty to perform future development serv-
ices in a good and workmanlike manner.
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a demonstrated need for it.87 Indeed, the only existing implied warranty
regarding services is limited to services provided to remedy defects ex-
isting at the time of the relevant consumer transaction.88 When a con-
sumer urges the recognition of a specific implied warranty, the consumer
must have sought or acquired that service in his transaction. 89 Thus, the
first order of business for the court was to determine which underlying
transaction could serve as the basis for the Woodruffs' claim.
The only transaction that the court could reasonably impose an implied
service warranty upon was the initial sale of the lot by Parkway to the
homebuilder. The court of appeals reasoned that because Sugar Creek
was a "master planned community," Parkway impliedly promised to per-
form all future development in a good and workmanlike manner. 90 The
Texas Supreme Court, however, refused to expand the meaning of
"master planned community" to mean "an implied promise to never 'ad-
versely affect' any homeowner in the community." 91 Accordingly, the
supreme court held that no implied warranty to perform future develop-
ment services should be imposed because no services existed in the un-
derlying transaction for which its service-related warranty could have
been breached. 92 Additionally, the Woodruffs failed to show why a negli-
gence cause of action did not provide adequate redress, and therefore,
public policy did not mandate the imposition of an implied warranty in
this instance. 93
2. Unconscionable Actions94
The Woodruffs also claimed that Parkway violated the DTPA by acting
unconscionably. 95 Because the Woodruffs' pleadings did not specify from
87. Id. at 438-39 (citing Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1985)(declining recov-
ery under an implied warranty theory because the plaintiff had adequate alternative
remedies).
88. Id. at 439. (citing Melody Homes, 741 S.W.2d at 354).
89. Id. (citing ARTHUR BIDDLE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WARRANTIES IN THE
SALE OF CHATrLES 1 (1884).
90. Parkway, 857 S.W.2d at 911.
91. Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 439-40. The court reviewed the term "planned commu-
nity" as it is used in the real estate community. It held that Sugar Creek had those features
common to a "planned community," i.e., a homeowner's association, common area, deed
restrictions, and a formal development plan. Id. at 440. "Parkway's use of the term to
describe its development can be fairly construed as a representation about the form of
common interest ownership, not an implied promise to provide future development serv-
ices of the type at issue here." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. DTPA § 17.50(a)(3).
95. Unconscionable action or course of conduct means an act or practice which,
to a person's detriment:
A) takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capac-
ity of a person to a grossly unfair degree; or
B) results in a gross disparity between the value received and considera-
tion paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration.
DTPA § 17.45(5). See infra Section III (C) (discussing the 1995 amendment to the defini-
tion of unconscionable which removed the gross disparity prong).
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which prong of the unconscionability definition they sought recovery, the
court analyzed their claim with regard to both prongs. Under the taking
advantage prong, the Woodruffs claimed that Parkway's exclusive control
over the drainage on the adjacent lots deprived them of the "ability or
capacity" to protect their property interests. 96 Because the action which
takes advantage must occur at the time of the sale, the court declined to
recognize Parkway's subsequent actions as unconscionable.
97
The Woodruffs then argued that the flooding caused by Parkway's ac-
tions created a gross disparity between the purchase price of their home
and its current value.98 The gross disparity must also exist at the time of
the sale.99 Because the disparity in value did not exist when the Wood-
ruffs purchased the house, the court could not find Parkway's actions
unconscionable. 100
The Tyler Court of Appeals also determined whether a defendant's
conduct was unconscionable. In Innovative Office Systems v. Johnson,1°0
Johnson had leased a color copy system from Innovative Office Systems
("Innovative"). Based on Johnson's known expectations and the repre-
sentations of an Innovative representative, Johnson decided to upgrade
his system. When the system failed to perform as expected and repre-
sented, Johnson brought suit alleging breach of contract, breach of war-
ranties, fraud and DTPA violations. 102
On appeal, the court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence to deter-
mine whether the defendant's conduct was unconscionable. 10 3 The court
defined "grossly unfair" conduct to mean unfair conduct that was "glar-
ingly noticeable, flagrant, complete and unmitigated.' 0 4 Based on the
depth of knowledge that the Innovative representative had regarding
Johnson's expectations, the representations made to Johnson by the Inno-
vative representative and Johnson's reliance on these facts when entering
into the transaction, the court held that evidence supported a finding that
Innovative had acted unconscionably.10 5
In Century 21 v. Hometown Real Estate Co.,106 Hometown purchased a
Century 21 franchise. As a highly successful franchise, Hometown re-
ceived an achievement award from Century 21 in 1986. Century 21 had
an unwritten policy of not placing a second franchise in an area served by
a franchise having a thirty to forty percent marketshare (the "30%
rule"). In early 1992, Hometown executed a new franchise agreement.
Both the agreement and the required Federal Trade Commission disclo-
96. Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 441.




101. 906 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App.-yler 1995, writ denied).
102. Id. at 940.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 948 (citing Kennemore v. Bennett, 755 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Tex. 1988)).
105. Id.
106. 890 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied).
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sure statement specifically stated that the franchise agreement does not
include any territorial rights or protected areas, which is in direct contra-
diction of the unwritten 30% rule.
Shortly after Hometown executed its new franchise agreement, Cen-
tury 21 granted another franchise in that area. Hometown sued Century
21, alleging violations of the DTPA.10 7 At trial, the jury rendered a ver-
dict for Hometown. 10 8 Century 21 appealed the verdict, alleging insuffi-
cient evidence to support the jury's findings. 0 9
The court of appeals reviewed the evidence to determine whether suffi-
cient evidence existed to support a finding that Century 21 had acted un-
conscionably. While the court did not find that a gross disparity between
consideration paid and value received existed," 0 the court found that the
evidence supported a finding that Century 21's action took advantage of
Hometown to a grossly unfair degree."' Hometown relied on the un-
written "30%" rule when renewing its franchise. "By signing the renewal
agreement, Hometown surrendered any leverage it had as a successful
franchise to block or otherwise resist a decision to place a second
franchise in its market.""112 Additionally, a Century 21 representative ad-
mitted that Hometown had forty percent of the market share in its county
and that Century 21 "may have pulled the trigger way too fast on this
one. 1" 3 Based on these facts, the court found sufficient evidence to sup-
port the jury's finding of unconscionable actions.'14
3. False, Misleading or Deceptive Acts-The Laundry List" 5
a. When is a Failure to Disclose Information Actionable?
Many DTPA claims are based on the defendant's failure to disclose
material information to the consumer prior to the transaction. To main-
tain a cause of action under the DTPA, "failure to disclose material infor-
mation necessarily requires that the defendant have known the
information and have failed to bring it to the plaintiff's attention.""11 6 A
107. Id. at 124.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The court could not find any evidence to support a finding of a "gross" disparity:
"Hometown must share the real estate market with another agency now, which in turn
harms its profit potential, but Hometown provided no proof that there is a gross disparity."
Id. at 127.
111. Century 21, 890 S.W.2d at 127-28.
112. Id. at 127.
113. Id. at 128.
114. Id.
115. DTPA § 17.46(a)-(b).
116. Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472,479 (Tex. 1995)(empha-
sis added)(citing DTPA § 17.46(b)(23)(stating that it is unlawful to fail to "disclose infor-
mation concerning ... services which was known at the time of the transaction") and
Robinson v. Preston Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex. 1982)(holding no
duty to disclose material facts exist if defendant does not know of them)). See also Century
21, 890 S.W.2d at 126 (holding that mere nondisclosure of a material fact is insufficient to
establish a DTPA claim, there must be a showing of intentional misconduct).
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defendant, however, who willfully maintains his ignorance to avoid the
duty of disclosure will not be protected. 117
In Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc.,118 grandparents brought
suit against the Boys Club for damages caused from sexual molestation of
their grandchildren by a volunteer worker. The grandmother claimed
that Boys Club failed to disclose material information regarding the qual-
ifications of one of its workers.119 She had inquired about a specific
worker's qualifications because he had offered to take her grandchildren
on a camping trip. In response to her inquiry, the Boys Club representa-
tive told her that it thoroughly checked out its volunteers and that the
volunteer seemed to be okay. The representative, however, failed to tell
her that the volunteer worker was a court-referred probationer serving a
criminal court's order of community service.1 20 The court held that this
was not actionable under the DTPA because the information was not
withheld for the purposes of inducing the grandmother into a consumer
transaction. 121
In Smith v. Herco, Inc.,122 a vendor made oral and written affirmations
that it would deed, sell, and give title to the purchaser of the entirety of a
townhouse. The representation was false. The purchaser sued the ven-
dor, alleging breach of contract, DTPA violations, and breaches of ex-
press and implied warranties. The jury found that the vendor had
breached its duty to know whether the representations were true1 23
On appeal, Herco (the vendor) argued that it could not be held liable
for the nondisclosure because it did not know that the townhouse ex-
tended into the common area. 24 The court held that Herco had a duty to
know.' 25 Accordingly, the court imputed that knowledge to Herco, trans-
forming its nondisclosure of a fact into an affirmative misrepresenta-
tion,126 thereby making Herco liable under the DTPA.127
117. Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 479.
118. Id at 472.
119. Id. at 479-80.
120. Id. at 479. His conviction was for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Furthermore,
as the court noted, an investigation of his criminal record would only have revealed his two
DWI convictions, and would not have revealed his propensity to sexually abuse young
boys. Id.
121. Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 479. The Boys Club did not promote or offer the camping trip.
As a result, its representative's misrepresentation was not made to induce the consumer
into a transaction; and therefore, was not actionable under the DTPA. Id. See DTPA
§ 17.46(b)(23).
122. 900 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).




127. Smith, 900 S.W.2d at 859.
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b. When does a Failure to Perform a Future Promise Become an
Actionable Affirmative Misrepresentation?
A mere breach of contract is not actionable under the DTPA.128 A
number of cases discuss the additional element that is required to change
a simple breach of contract case into a DTPA claim.' 29 The additional
requirement is the showing that at the time the promise was made, the
promisor had no intentions of fulfilling the promise.130 This determina-
tion can be made based on the nature of the promise and the surrounding
circumstances. 131
In Kuehnhoefer v. Welch, 132 a dispute arose over the renewal of a lease
for which the Welchs filed a cause of action under DTPA.133 It was the
Welch's contention that Kuehnhoefer misrepresented to them that he
would renew their existing lease for five years.1 34 Kuehnhoefer con-
tended that while this may be a breach of contract cause of action, it
certainly was not a DTPA violation.1 35 Even though the jury instruction
did not limit the jury to consider whether this was a false, deceptive, or
misleading act only at the time of the transaction, the court of appeals
stated that the evidence in the record was sufficient to support such a
finding.' 36 Thus, this is a very circumstance specific analysis.
C. WHAT CONSTITUTES A PRODUCING CAUSE?
In order to recover damages under the DTPA, the consumer must
prove that the defendant's conduct was a producing cause. 137 A produc-
ing cause is an efficient, exciting or contributing cause, which in the natu-
ral sequence, produced injuries or damages.' 38 While the law does not
require reliance or foreseeability, 139 some causal connection must exist
between the deceptive act and actual damages suffered.' 40
128. La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex.
1984).
129. See Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no
writ); Coleman v. Hughes Blanton, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1980, writ denied); Holloway v. Dannenmaier, 581 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




133. Id. at 691.
134. Id. at 693.
135. Keuhnhoefer, 893 S.W.2d at 693.
136. Id.
137. Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
138. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975). There can be more than one
producing cause of damages. Id.
139. Allied Towing Serv. v. Mitchell, 833 S.W.2d 577, 585 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no
writ).
140. Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 602-03.
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1. When Does a Causal Connection Exist?
A negligent act and an injury are not necessarily causally connected. 141
The plaintiff must show an unbroken causal connection between the act
and the injury.142 In Doe, the grandparents alleged that representations
made by the Boys Club's representative that it provided a wholesome
environment and that it thoroughly checked out its volunteers violated
the DTPA. Because an unbroken connection between the Boys Club's
misrepresentations and the sexual molestation of the children could not
be shown the Texas Supreme Court denied liability under the DTPA.143
2. Attorney Malpractice as a Producing Cause
a. Criminal Cases
During the last Survey Period, the Dallas Court of Appeals faced a
question of first impression regarding the standard of producing cause to
be applied in criminal cases. 44 In Peeler v. Hughes & Luce,145 the Dallas
Court of Appeals noted the strong public policy reasons for recognizing a
criminal defendant's culpability as the superseding cause of a convic-
tion.146 Upon review, the Texas Supreme Court agreed holding that the
criminal's own conduct is the sole cause of an indictment and subsequent
conviction.147 Thus, unless she can first establish her own innocence, a
criminal defendant cannot sue her attorney under the DTPA for
malpractice.' 48
b. Civil Cases
In Haynes & Boone v. Bowser Bouldin, Ltd.,in9 Bouldin hired Haynes
& Boone to represent him in a suit seeking recision of a lease brought by
the anchor tenant of his strip mall. The attorney in charge of Bouldin's
case failed to respond to certain discovery requests in a timely manner.
As a sanction, the trial court struck Bouldin's pleadings. The attorney
filed a motion to reconsider, which was granted, and the court ordered
defendant's attorney to pay $1,500 and reinstated defendant's pleadings.
When the attorney failed to pay the sanction, the court permanently
141. Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 481 (citing General Motors Corp. V. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353,
361 n.6 (Tex. 1993)).
142. Id.
143. The court noted that the volunteer worker developed a relationship with the boys'
grandparents outside of the Boys Club. Id. Additionally, when the grandmother came to
inquire about the volunteer because she was considering allowing him to take the boys
camping, the representative stated that "[t]he Boys Club couldn't make that choice for
her." Id. Accordingly, the court held that the causal connection was not unbroken by
external factors. Id.
144. See Survey 1994, supra note 34, at 1127-28.
145. 868 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993), affd, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. 1, 1094 (Aug. 1,
1995).
146. Id. at 827-33.
147. 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1094.
148. Peeler, 868 S.W.2d 823, 834.
149. 896 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1995).
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struck the defendant's pleadings. As a result, Bouldin entered into a set-
tlement agreement with the tenant which included a provision allowing
the tenant to give ninety days notice and vacate the premises.' 5 0
At trial, Bouldin contended that the loss of his anchor tenant, precipi-
tated by the attorney's malpractice, caused the resultant foreclosure on
his strip mall.15' A review of the evidence, however, revealed the follow-
ing facts:
(1) Tenant planned on leaving;
(2) By the time defendant's pleadings were struck, the terms of the
lease allowed the tenant to leave with only one year's rent; and
(3) By the time defendant's pleadings were struck, the tenant had
also signed a lease at another location.' 52
Bouldin argued that he lost valuable rights against the tenant due to the
unfavorable settlement he was forced into because of his attorney's mal-
practice. 153 After reviewing the evidence, the Texas Supreme Court held
that because there was no evidence that Haynes & Boone was the "pro-
ducing cause" of the foreclosure, Bouldin could not recover his loss of
investment and foreclosure deficiency damages.154 The Supreme Court
did, however, award Bouldin attorney's fees and expenses for both
cases.
155
Mackie v. McKenzie156 involves DTPA claims brought against an attor-
ney by his former clients. The Mackies hired McKenzie and his firm to
represent them in a will contest. After McKenzie refused to write an
opinion letter outlining their potential recovery in the will contest, the
Mackies fired him.157 Thereafter, McKenzie was granted a motion to
withdraw.' 58 The next day, McKenzie's associate sent a letter to the Ma-
ckies notifying them of the date any written responses were due and of a
pending hearing on a motion for partial summary judgment. The Mack-
ies failed to obtain substitute counsel in time, and the trial court granted
partial summary judgment against them in their will contest case.' 59 Sub-
sequently, the Mackies entered into a settlement with the estate. In turn,
they sued McKenzie, his associate, and their firm, alleging negligence and
DTPA violations. 160
The defendants were granted a motion for summary judgment by the
trial court.' 6 ' On appeal, the court noted that "[w]hen a client sues his
attorney on the ground that the latter caused him to lose his cause of
150. Id. at 181.
151. Id. at 181-82.
152. Id. at 182.
153. Id.
154. 896 S.W.2d at 183.
155. Id.
156. 900 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied)
157. Id. at 448.
158. Id.
159. Id.




action, the burden of proof is on the client to prove that his suit would
have been successful but for the negligence of his attorney .... ,u62 Be-
cause the Mackies failed to establish that they would have won the under-
lying will contest, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment in
favor of McKenzie. 163
3. The Effect of an "As Is" Clause on Establishing a Producing Cause
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd. ,164
the Texas supreme court determined the effect of an "as is" clause in a
commercial sales transaction. The purchaser of a commercial building
sued the vendor for misrepresentations and concealment regarding the
existence of asbestos in the building. 165 The purchaser alleged violations
of the DTPA and fraudulent concealment. The jury awarded the pur-
chaser over six million dollars in actual damages, and over fourteen mil-
lion in punitive damages. 166 The court of appeals affirmed this award. 167
The Texas supreme court, however, held that unless Jefferson could
show that it was induced to make the "as is" agreement because of a
fraudulent representation or concealment of information by Prudential, it
could not establish the causation requirement. 68 After reviewing the ev-
idence, the court held that: 1) no evidence existed to indicate that Pru-
dential knew the building contained asbestos at the time of the sale; 169 2)
Jefferson could have discovered asbestos from a site inspection; and 3)
Prudential's representative's statements that the building was in great
shape was merely puffing or opinion.' 70 Because Jefferson could not
show that he was somehow fraudulently induced into making the "as is"
agreement, the court held that he could not establish the causation ele-
ment of his claims and reversed the judgment. 171
During the Survey period, the San Antonio Court of Appeals also had
the opportunity to review the effect of an "as is" clause on a plaintiff's
DTPA claims.172 In Smith v. Levine,173 the appellees, the Levines,
purchased a house from the Smiths. The Smiths knew that an engineer
162. Id.
163. Id. at 449-51.
164. 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
165. Id. at 159.
166. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 896 S.W.2d at 160.
167. See 839 S.W.2d 866, 879 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992).
168. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 896 S.W.2d at 161.
169. See supra Section IIB(3)(a) (failure to disclose information is not actionable unless
defendant knew or had a duty to know information at the time of the transaction).
170. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 896 S.W.2d at 162-63. See also Autohaus, Inc. v. Agui-
lar, 794 S.W.2d 459, 462-64 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), writ denied per curiam, 800 S.W.2d
853 (Tex. 1991) (statements by salesman were too general to be an actionable misrepresen-
tation but were merely puffing or opinion); but cf. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d
682, 687 (Tex. 1980)(statements that boat was "new" or "perfect" was not merely puffing
or opinion).
171. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 896 S.W.2d at 164.
172. Smith v. Levine, No. 04-94-00241-CV, 1995 WL 539851 (Tex. App.-San Antonio




had inspected the house and determined that the foundation was defec-
tive, however, they marketed the house in local newspapers, describing it
as being in "excellent" condition.' 74 In response to one of the ads, the
Levines became interested in the house. The Levines purchased the
house after being assured that the cracks were superficial and routine for
a house in that area.175. A year later, they decided to sell the house.
When an interested buyer accidentally hired the same engineer that had
originally determined the foundation was defective, the Levines lost the
sale and realized that the Smiths had concealed this from them. The
Levines sued the Smiths for DTPA violations, for which a jury awarded
them $81,792.62 in damages.176
On appeal, the Smiths relied on the existence of an "as is" clause in the
earnest money contract to negate the Levines element of causation.1 77
Reviewing the Texas Supreme Court's Prudential holding, 78 the court of
appeals interpreted Prudential's mandate as requiring courts "to deter-
mine the validity of the 'as is' agreement at issue in light of the sophistica-
tion of the parties, the terms of the 'as is' agreement, and whether there
was a knowing misrepresentation or concealment of a known fact.' 79
While the Prudential "as is" clause was specifically worded for that con-
tract, the "as is" clause in Smith came from a preprinted form used by the
sellers.180 While no evidence existed that Prudential or its representative
knew that the building contained asbestos when it was sold, the Smiths
clearly knew that the foundation of their house was defective. 18' The
Smiths made affirmative oral misrepresentations upon which the Levines
relied. 182 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the Smiths' "as is"
clause could not negate the Levines' element of causation. 183
A. DTPA DAMAGES.
1. Offsetting DTPA claims
Under the DTPA, a plaintiff must establish that he is a consumer, that
defendant committed a deceptive trade practice, and that such conduct
was the producing cause of damage. Once the plaintiff establishes each of
these elements, he is entitled to compensation for his damages.' 84 How
damages should be calculated is a common issue in DTPA cases.
In Hamra v. Gulden,185 a former patient sued her plastic surgeon and a
magazine for publishing her photograph in conjunction with an article
174. Id. at *1.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *2.
177. Smith, 1995 WL 539851 at *3.
178. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. 1995).
179. Smith, 1995 WL 539851 at *4.
180. Id. at *3.
181. Id. at *5.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. DTPA § 17.50(a)(1).
185. 898 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ requested).
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featuring the doctor and his techniques. 186 While the magazine company,
Conde Naste Publications, settled with the patient for $8,000, the doctor
proceeded to trial and elected a dollar-for-dollar settlement credit.187
The jury awarded the patient $2,500 in actual damages, and the trial court
awarded her $5,000 in additional damages under the DTPA and then
granted a settlement credit which resulted in the patient not recovering
anything for actual damages, however, she did receive compensation for
attorneys' fees and court cost.' 88
On appeal, the doctor argued that under the DTPA only a "prevailing
party" could recover attorneys' fees, 189 and that the patient was not a
prevailing party.' 90 The court, however, drew a distinction in the case
before it because the patient's claim was entirely offset by a settling party
who, by definition is not an opposing party at trial.' 9' As a result, the
court of appeals held that patient was not a "prevailing party," and there-
fore, was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees. 192
2. Trebling Prejudgment Interest
The question is really whether prejudgment interest should be consid-
ered part of a consumer's actual damages because if it is, then it would be
included in any amount that is trebled. The courts of appeal are split on
this issue.1 93 While the supreme court has yet to squarely address this




190. Id. at 18-19. A consumer can recover attorneys' fees for the successful prosecution
of a DTPA claim even though opposing party's claim entirely offsets consumer's claim. Id.
at 19 (citing McKinely v. Drozd, 685 S.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Tex. 1985)).
191. Id. at 19. "It is one thing to allow a party an attorney's fees award on a successful
claim notwithstanding an opposing party's success on an offsetting claim. However, it is
another to allow attorney's fees on a claim that, although successful, was paid in full before
trial." Id. (citing Blizzard v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
192. Hamra, 898 S.W.2d at 19.
193. The Houston, Fort Worth, El Paso, and San Antonio courts have held that pre-
judgment interest is not to be trebled in DTPA and insurance cases. Roberts v. Grande,
868 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1994, writ denied); Benefit Trust Life
Ins. Co. v. Littles, 869 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993), remanded for entry of
judgment, 873 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. 1994); Group Medical & Surgical Serv. Inc. v. Leong, 750
S.W.2d 791,798 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, writ denied); Hope v. Allstate Ins. Co., 719
S.W.2d 634, 638 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Precision Homes, Inc. v.
Cooper, 671 S.W.2d 924, 930-31 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Rotello v. Ring Around Prods., Inc., 614 S.W.2d 455,463 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist]
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The Dallas, Austin, Beaumont, and Texarkana courts have included prejudgment inter-
est in actual damages and trebled it. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Fulda, No. 09-94-168 CV,
1995 WL 261996 at *41 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, May 4, 1995 writ requested); Crum &
Forster, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 887 S.W.2d 103, 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994) re-
manded; Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 831 S.W.2d 592, 599 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), aff'd
as modified, 885 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1994); Paramore v. Nehring, 792 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, no writ); Indust-Ri-Chem Lab. v. Par-Pak Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 282,
295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
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issue, 194 the legislature addressed the issue as part of its 1995 Amend-
ments to the DTPA, discussed in the next section. The 1995 Amendments
prohibited prejudgment interest from being considered when computing
additional damages under the statute.195
III. THE 1995 AMENDMENTS TO THE DTPA196
During its 1995 session, the legislature overhauled the DTPA. Almost
every section was subject to an amendment of some sort ranging from the
simple tune-up to a major repair. Apparently, the legislature was deter-
mined to limit its expansive scope. This section explores the significant
1995 amendments which will have a profound impact on the DTPA.
A. SECTION 17.42. WAIVERS: PUBLIC POLICY
Up until this point, consumers could only waive their DTPA rights in
big money transactions where the consideration paid was $500,000 or
more or where the consumer had a personal net worth of $5 million or
more. After the 1995 amendments, however, any consumer can execute a
valid waiver of his DTPA rights, as long as the waiver meets the following
requirements:
(1) it is in writing;197
(2) it is signed by the consumer;
(3) the consumer was not in a significantly disparate bargaining posi-
tion; and
(4) the consumer was represented by legal counsel in the transaction
in question. 198
Even though the amendments seem to make it easier for consumers to
waive their DTPA rights in a greater number of transactions, the require-
ment that the consumer be represented by counsel will significantly limit
the number of transactions covered by this exemption. However, over
time waivers will effectively negate the DTPA as a oommercial litigation
tool, because presumably most vendors will require a waiver as part of
most major transactions. 199
194. See Fulda, 1995 WL 261996 at *42 (J. Burgess, dissenting).
195. DTPA § 17.50(f).
196. This section is reprinted from the DTPA - Then and Now, supra note 52.
197. DTPA § 17.42(a)(1). The amendments also require that the waiver be identified in
the text by the heading "Waiver of Consumer Rights" or by words of similar meaning, and
that the text be placed conspicuously and done in bold-face, 10 point type. DTPA
§ 17.42(c)(1)(2). The amendment goes further to suggest a suitable waiver provision that
reads: "I waive my rights under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act,
Section 17.41 et seq., Business & Commerce Code, a law that gives consumers special
rights and protections. After consultation with an attorney of my own selection, I volunta-
rily consent to this waiver." DTPA § 17.42(c)(3).
198. DTPA § 17.42 (a)(1-3). The section, however, also states that an otherwise valid
waiver will not be so considered if the consumer's legal counsel was in anyway suggested,
identified, or selected by the defendant or its agent. DTPA § 17.42(b) (1995).
199. The exclusion of a waiver for the purchase or lease of a residence is still in effect.
See DTPA § 17.49(f)(3), (g).
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B. SECTION 17.44. CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION
Having never been amended, this provision mandates that courts "lib-
erally construe" and apply the DTPA "to promote its underlying pur-
poses. 200 In this round of amendments, however, the legislature added a
new subsection which states that Chapter 27, the Property Code, prevails
over the DTPA to the extent the two conflict. 201
C. SECTION 17.45. DEFINITIONS
The legislature amended two of the existing definitions-"unconscion-
able action" and "knowingly. '20 2 It also added three new definitions-
"economic damages," "residence" and "intentionally. ' 20 3 In amending
the "unconscionable action" definition, the legislature removed the
"gross disparity" prong that allowed consumers to sue when a gross dis-
parity of value existed between the consideration paid for and the value
received in a transaction.20 4
The revision of "knowingly" and the addition of definitions for "eco-
nomic damages" and "intentionally," reflect the changes enacted in the
DTPA's damage scheme outlined in section 17.50.205 The 1995 amend-
ments revised the definition of "knowingly" to specify that the defendant
must possess actual awareness of the "act, practice, condition, defect, or
failure" giving rise to the consumer's complaint "at the time" of the trans-
action in issue. 206 As defined, "economic damages" means compensatory
damages for pecuniary loss, but does not include damages for mental
anguish, loss of consortium, companionship, or society, or physical in-
jury.207 Finally, "intentionally" means that defendant acted not only with
knowledge, but that he acted with the specific intent that the consumer
act in detrimental reliance. 20 8 Thus, the DTPA has been brought more in
200. DTPA § 17.44 (1973-1993).
201. DTPA § 17.44(b). It is unclear why the legislature placed this provision here
rather than in section 17.49 to which it added several areas of law that will now be excluded
from the purview of the DTPA. See infra section III (E), (discussing the additions to
§ 17.49).
202. DTPA § 17.45(5), (9).
203. DTPA § 17.45(11)-(13).
204. DTPA § 17.45(5). The gross disparity test has typically been applied when the
product received is something other than what the buyer sought or when the product is
virtually worthless, at least in comparison to the goods sought. See, e.g. Dwight's Discount
Vacuum Cleaner City, Inc. v. Scott Fetzer Co., 860 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1108 (1989)("[T]he 'gross disparity' test obviously mirrors a fraud-type measure
of recovery, in which a consumer receives a product inferior in quality to that which he
intended to buy or, alternatively, when the consumer is defrauded out of his money en-
tirely." 860 F.2d at 650-51.); Teague v. Bandy, 793 S.W.2d 50, 56 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990,
writ denied) (finding a gross disparity in value when a cow purchased as an embryo donor
proved to be infertile).
205. See infra Section III (f) and accompanying text (discussing DTPA's new damage
scheme).
206. DTPA § 17.45(9).
207. DTPA § 17.45(11).
208. DTPA § 17.45(13). Basically, a defendant acted intentionally if he acted to de-
fraud the consumer. His intent, however, will be inferred if the facts indicate that he acted




D. SECTION 17.46. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES UNLAWFUL
This section contains the "laundry list" of unlawful practices. The only
change in this section was the addition of a new unlawful practice to the
laundry list. The 1995 amendments added section 17.46(25), making it
actionable to take advantage of a declared disaster by selling or leasing
necessities, (i.e. fuel, food and medicine), for an exorbitant or excessive
price.209
E. SECTION 17.49. EXEMPTIONS
Originally, this section contained only two exemptions. The first ex-
empts from liability the innocent owners and employees of regularly pub-
lished or broadcast mediums for advertisements contained in their
publication or broadcast that violate the DTPA. The second exemption
exempts acts or practices authorized by the Federal Trade Commission in
Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.210 The 1995
amendments add four new exemptions to this section.
The 1995 provisions exempts from liability professionals whose service
is to provide advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skills.211
This exemption does not apply if the professional makes an express mis-
representation of a material fact, acts unconscionably, or breaches an ex-
press warranty in ways that cannot be characterized as advice, opinion, or
judgment, or if the professional fails to disclose information in violation
of section 17.46(b)(23). 212 While clearly intended to protect lawyers and
accountants from claims of malpractice, the exceptions to the exemption
are difficult to understand and easily circumvented by creative pleading.
The 1995 provisions also prohibit claimants from asserting DTPA
causes of action in conjunction with actions for bodily injury, death, or
the infliction of mental anguish.213 This addition effectively eliminates
the DTPA from being alleged in tort actions.
The new exemptions also eliminate from the purview of the DTPA,
certain contractual transactions evidenced by a written contract. One ex-
empts those transactions in which the consideration paid is between
$100,000 and $500,000 and the consumer is represented by counsel, who
was not suggested by the defendant. 214 The other exempts those transac-
tions in which the consideration paid is over $500,000.215 Neither of these
exemptions, however, applies if the transaction at issue involves the con-
209. DTPA § 17.46(25).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1989).
211. DTPA § 17.49(c). This exemption also covers the entities which may be found
vicariously liable for a professional's conduct. DTPA § 17.49(d).
212. DTPA § 17.49(c)(1-4).
213. DTPA § 17.49(e). Mental anguish damages, however, are recoverable when a con-
sumer can prove that a defendant acted "knowingly" or "intentionally."
214. DTPA § 17.49(f).




F. SECTION 17.50. RELIEF FOR CONSUMERS
This section received significant attention during the 1995 legislative
session. In section 17.50(a), the legislature amended the text allowing a
consumer to maintain an action for economic damages or damages for
mental anguish. 217 This amendment, however, conflicts with the new pro-
vision in section 17.49 that exempts causes of action solely for mental
anguish from the ambit of the DTPA.218 How this conflict will be re-
solved is unclear.
More importantly, the legislature amended section 17.50(a) to include
an element of transactional reliance. A consumer has a cause of action
where the producing cause of their damage is "the use or employment by
any person of a false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice that is: (A)
specifically enumerated in [the laundry list]; and (B) relied on by a con-
sumer to the consumer's detriment.1219 This addition not only acts to
increase the individual consumer's burden of proof, but it also adds an
element to a consumer claim that may differ between consumers thus cre-
ating consumer class actions in the future.
By amending section 17.50(b), the legislature revised the DTPA's dam-
age scheme. Because the DTPA is no longer applicable to tort-type
cases, these changes were no longer necessary, and therefore, eliminated
by the 1995 amendments.
Under the new damage scheme, a prevailing consumer is always enti-
tled to economic damages.220 If the consumer proves that defendant ac-
ted "knowingly," he can also recover mental anguish damages and
potentially receive treble his economic damages.221 If the consumer
proves that defendant acted "intentionally," he can recover both eco-
nomic and mental anguish damages, as well as a possible trebling of both
amounts.222 In calculating treble damages, however, the legislature spe-
cifically limited those amounts that could be included in the computation
by adding a new provision which states that attorneys' fees, costs and
prejudgment interest are not to be included.223
216. DTPA § 17.49(f)(3), (g). See DTPA § 17.45 (12) (defining the term "residence" to
mean, "a building that is a single-family house, duplex, triplex, or quadruplex or a unit in a
multi-unit residential structure in which title to the individual units is transferred to the
owners under a condominium or cooperative system and that is occupied or to be occupied
as the consumer's residence.").
217. DTPA § 17.50(a).
218. Compare DTPA § 17.49(e), with DTPA § 17.50 (a). Perhaps, to avoid the conflict,
the legislature should have worded section 17.50(a) to read conjunctively by using "and"
instead of "or."
219. DTPA § 17.50(a) (emphasis added).
220. DTPA § 17.50(b).
221. Id.
222. Id.




G. SECTION 17.505. NOTICE; INSPECTION
The legislature severed the provisions regarding settlement offers from
this section and created a new section - section 17.505: Offers of Settle-
ment. The amended notice provision is now limited in scope to notifica-
tion of DTPA claims and the right to inspect. The amended section
requires the notice to advise in reasonable detail, the consumer's specific
complaint, the amount of economic damages claimed, the estimated cash
value for mental anguish damages experienced, and any expenses in-
curred up to the point of giving notice.224 In addition, when notice is
rendered impractical by necessity of filing suit to prevent the expiration
of the statute of limitations, the time period in which the defendant may
tender an offer has been changed from within 60 days after the filing of
the DTPA claim to within 60 days after service of the DTPA suit or coun-
terclaim.225 These changes will make it easier to draft DTPA notice let-
ters and presumably much easier to draft class action notice letters.
The legislature also added a new provision for instances where the con-
sumer fails to give notice, as required by section 17.505(a), and does not
have a justifiable excuse, such as limitations. Under the new provision, if
a consumer fails to give notice of his DTPA claim prior to filing suit and is
not justified in his failure by a limitations restraint, the defendant may file
a plea in abatement, as long as he does so within 30 days of filing his
original answer in the DTPA suit.226 After a hearing on the matter, the
court must abate the suit if the consumer's failure to provide notice was
not excusable under the exceptions outlined in section 17.505(b). 227 Such
an abatement continues for 60 days after the consumer serves written
notice on defendant in compliance with section 17.505(a). 228
H. SECTION 17.5051. MEDIATION
The legislature now requires mediation to promote out-of-court settle-
ment of consumer claims. Under the mediation provisions, a party may
compel mediation in a DTPA case by filing a motion to compel within 90
days of receiving service of the SUit. 22 9 Within 30 days of filing this mo-
tion, the court must sign an order setting the time and place of the media-
tion.230 The mediation must be held within 30 days after the order for
mediation is signed, unless the parties agree otherwise or the court deter-
224. DTPA § 17.505(a) (adding the requirement that any claim for mental anguish
damages be separately identified and included in the notice).
225. DTPA § 17.505(b).
226. DTPA § 17.505(c).
227. DTPA § 17.505(d). A suit will automatically be abated without order of the court
starting on the eleventh day after the plea in abatement is filed, if the plea is verified and
alleges that defendant did not receive notice, and the consumer does not file a contro-
verting affidavit in response before the eleventh day after the plea in abatement is filed.
Id.
228. DTPA § 17.505(e).
229. DTPA § 17.5051(a).
230. DTPA § 17.5051(b). If the parties cannot agree on a mediator, the court will ap-
point one. DTPA § 17.5051(c).
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mines that additional time is warranted. 23' Normally, the cost of media-
tion will be borne equally between the parties participating in the
mediation.232
I. SEcTiON 17.5052. OFFERS OF SETTLEMENT
Even though the settlement provisions were moved to a new section,
and they remain largely unchanged. The legislature did, however, add a
few new subsections describing how the mediation rules will interact with
the existing settlement rules. When mediation is not compelled in a
DTPA case, the defendant can tender a settlement offer at anytime from
the date of filing an original answer, to 90 days thereafter. 233 However, if
a mediation is conducted then the settlement period runs from the day
after mediation and extends 20 days.234
J. SECrION 17.56. VENUE
The legislature amended the venue provision. The amendment elimi-
nated the venue provision added by the 1979 amendments that allowed
suit to be brought in any county where the seller was doing business. In
its place, the legislature included a new provision allowing suit to be
brought in any place that would be proper under Chapter 15 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. 235 While this addition has expanded the
venue possibilities, it primarily caused the DTPA to conform more to the
general laws of Texas.
K. EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 1995 AMENDMENTS
The Act takes effect on September 1, 1995. All causes of action that
accrue on or after that date are governed by the Act. Regardless of when
a cause of action accrued, this Act will also apply to all DTPA cases filed
on or after September 1, 1996.236 If the cause of action accrued before
September 1, 1995 and is filed before September 1, 1996, then the amend-
ments do not apply. In such instances, the case will be governed by the
current version of the DTPA.
IV. CONCLUSION
Originally, the legislature enacted the DTPA to give a private right of
231. DTPA § 17.5051(d). A court ordered extension, however, cannot exceed an addi-
tional 30 days. Id.
232. DTPA § 17.5051(e) (1995). An exception exists where the amount of economic
damages claimed by the consumer is less than $15,000. In those instances, mediation can-
not be compelled unless the party seeking mediation agrees to bear the entire cost. DTPA§ 17.5051(f) (1995). This caveat protects smaller consumers with minor claims from being
forced out of their suit because of an inability to pay mediation costs.
233. DTPA § 17.5052(b).
234. DTPA § 17.5052(c).
235. DTPA § 17.56(1).
236. The amended venue provision, however, applies to all causes of action that ac-
crued before September 1, 1995 and are filed on that date or thereafter.
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action to consumers. 237 Since its inception, however, Texas courts have
expanded the reach of the DTPA because of its broad terminology and its
mandate for a liberal approach. 238 Indeed, the DTPA is no stranger to
large commercial litigation cases. Accordingly, both the 1995 legislative
amendments and the Survey period cases indicate the new trend to limit
the DTPA and to restore it to its original purpose, as a remedy for the
wronged small consumer.
237. See 167 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 274, § 1, at 608-09; Id. at § 2, arts. 10.01-.05, at 658-59(codified as TEX. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-10.01-.05 (Vernon 1970)).
238. See generally, DTPA - Then and Now, supra note 52.
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